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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the growth effect of environmental taxes when the time 
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1. Introduction 
 In the literature on environmental economics, environmental externalities mainly 
affect the economy via two channels.  First, they affect the households’ welfare.  A 
better environment undoubtedly brings us more happiness (see, e.g., Bovenberg and 
de Mooij, 1994; Chen et al., 2003; Pommeret and Schubert, 2009; Prieur and Bréchet, 
2013).  Second, they may be related to the firm’s productivity.  For example, better 
water quality improves workers’ health, and better air quality slows the depreciation 
of equipment, both of which make the production process more productive (see, e.g., 
Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995; Smulders and Gradus, 1996; Fullerton and Kim, 
2008; Chang et al., 2009).  
 Compared with the impact of the environment on welfare and production, what 
is not so widely noticed is that the people’s degree of time preferences can also be 
influenced by environmental quality.  For example, supposing that the 
environmentalists declare that the problem of global warming will become very 
severe in the near future, one would expect that consumption will increase and that 
saving will fall, because saving (for future consumption) now becomes more 
uncertain.  This means that fears of an environmental disaster may alter people’s 
time preferences so that they will prefer current consumption.  By the same token, 
we can also imagine that a better air quality may cause agents to be more willing to 
save for the future.   
 In addition to the common logic, we could also rationalize the assumption of 
environment-dependent time preferences based on theoretical arguments.1  In their 
                                                 
1
 There are few (if not no) empirical studies that directly examine the linkage between time 
preferences and environmental quality.  Nonetheless, the experiments in Viscusi et al. (2008), which 
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seminal paper, Becker and Mulligan (1997) indicate that mortality and wealth are 
important factors that affect time preferences.  Although environmental quality has 
not been explicitly included, it can and does play an influential role in affecting these 
factors.  As an immediate example, a cleaner environment makes us healthier and 
reduces mortality, which increases the incentives to save (Agénor, 2010).  This 
positive link between life expectancy and patience supports the theory that a better 
environment decreases time preferences.   
 As for the alternative case where a better environment increases time preferences, 
the reasoning could be theoretically justified through the following two channels.  
The first channel highlights the relationship between environmental quality and utility.  
On the one hand, a better environmental quality increases the household utility based 
on the fact that environmental quality can improve a household’s amenities and health; 
while on the other hand many studies have recognized that time preferences increase 
with utility (see, e.g., Uzawa, 1968; Nairay, 1984; Epstein, 1987; Chang et al., 1998).  
The second channel emphasizes the linkage between environmental quality and 
wealth.  On the one hand, environmental quality has been treated as a “natural asset” 
by environmental economists (Hartwick, 1991; Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995, 1996).  
The notion of a “natural asset” or “environmental capital” can be extensively regarded 
as a kind of wealth.  On the other hand, allowing impatience to depend positively on 
wealth has both theoretical and empirical identifications (Lucas and Stocky, 1984; 
Mohsin, 2004; Kam, 2005).2  Equipped with these two possible channels, we have 
                                                                                                                                            
show that people who have access to water quality have a lower rate of time preference than those who 
do not, provide some indirect evidence of such a linkage.    
2
 These studies argue that this time preference specification generates a Tobin effect, and moreover is 
consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis that regards consumption as an increasing function of wealth.  
 3
good grounds for considering the case where time preferences increase with the 
environmental quality. 
 Despite the logical rationale, existing theoretical studies on how environmental 
quality affects agents’ time preferences are scarce and inconclusive.  Pittel (2002) is 
the first attempt to develop a model in which the environment can, negatively or 
positively, influence the society’s discount rate.  Ayong Le Kama and Schubert 
(2007) consider a discount rate that is positively associated with the environmental 
quality.  The basic idea is that the society chooses to discount at a lower rate when 
the environmental quality is low, because in this case the environmental problem 
becomes more pressing and doing so can help to prevent further deteriorations in the 
environment.  On the contrary, Yanase (2011) and Vella et al. (2014) use the 
assumption that a better environment leads to increased patience.  The justification is 
that, intuitively, lower pollution implies better health and thus a lower mortality rate, 
which makes households more patient and willing to trade current consumption for 
future consumption.   
On the other hand, and perhaps due to analytical simplicity, most theoretical 
studies on the interaction between growth and the environment assume a constant 
time preference.3  However, as emphasized by Weitzman (1994), the assumption of a 
constant time preference may be inappropriate especially in a world with increasing 
environmental concerns.  Accordingly, once we take into consideration the effect of 
environmental quality on people’s patience, the following questions naturally arise:  
                                                                                                                                            
It is worth noting that there are also some studies (e.g., Lawrence, 1991; Ogaki and Atkenson, 1997; 
Samwick, 1998) which on the contrary support the theory that time preferences decrease with wealth. 
3
 See, e.g., Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1994), Bovenberg and Smulders (1995), Chen et al. (2003), 
Itaya (2008), and Fullerton and Kim (2008).  
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What are the consequences of environmental policies for economic growth?  What is 
the optimal rate of the environmental tax?  Owing to the fact that none of the 
aforementioned articles with environmentally endogenous time preferences deals with 
these issues, we aim to explore them in this paper. 
To this end, we develop a simple endogenous growth model featuring the capital 
externality suggested by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), in which the time 
preference is endogenized in the sense that it will be influenced by the environmental 
quality.  As in Pittel (2002), we do not restrict the direction of such an effect.  We 
allow three possibilities to occur, that is: the environmental quality may positively or 
negatively affect or not at all affect the agents’ time preferences.  Our results show 
that, in the absence of an endogenous time preference, there will always exist a 
trade-off relationship between the environmental protection and economic growth.  
However, in the presence of an additional external effect arising from the impact of 
environmental quality on the time preference, a higher environmental tax may boost 
the balanced growth rate.  Although there are already numerous studies that advocate 
a positive growth effect of the environmental tax,4 our analysis contributes to the 
literature by focusing on the positive effect resulting from an endogenous time 
preference depending on the environment.  
 Another interesting finding concerns the optimal rate of the environmental tax.  
The well-known Pigouvian tax requires that the optimal environmental tax rate be 
equal to the marginal social damage from pollution.  Our result shows that, when 
                                                 
4
 For the positive growth effect of the environmental tax, see, for instance, van Ewijk and van 
Wijnbergen (1995), Bovenberg and Smulders (1995, 1996), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997), Smulders 
and Gradus (1996), Hettich (1998), Chen et al. (2003), Ono (2003a, 2003b), van Zon and Yetkiner 
(2003), Nakada (2004, 2010), Ricci (2007), Itaya (2008), and Pautrel (2012). 
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agents’ time preferences can be influenced by the environment, the Pigouvian tax rate 
may be inefficient because it fails to internalize the impact of the additional 
environmental externality on time preferences.  Furthermore, the optimal 
environmental tax rate could be higher than, lower than, or equal to the marginal 
damage from pollution, depending on the distinctive features of the time preference. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way.  Section 2 
presents the basic growth model with endogenous time preferences.  Section 3 
discusses the policy implications of an endogenous time preference on economic 
growth.  Section 4 examines the efficiency of the Pigouvian environmental tax.  
The final section concludes.  
 
2. The Model 
 We consider an infinite-horizon economy comprised of a continuum of identical 
households, a large number of polluting firms, and a government.  All firms are 
assumed to be identical and we normalize the number to unity.  A representative firm 
produces a single final good y  using the technology αα −Λ= 1zky  ( 01 >>α )5, 
where k  is the capital employed and z  denotes a “dirty input”.  To ensure 
sustainable growth, we assume that the term Λ  represents the Romer-type 
externality on capital, i.e., α−=Λ 1AK , where K  is the aggregate capital stock, and 
0>A  is a constant technology parameter.6  Because the number of firms is unity, 
                                                 
5
 The time arguments are omitted for notational simplicity. 
6
 The role of Λ  is to ensure constant returns to scale to (a broad sense of) capital, and is thus able to 
sustain ongoing growth.  This technology, which has been known as the AK-type endogenous growth 
model, exhibits a merit of obtaining tractable results and has been extensively used to analyze the 
effects of policies on growth performance.  Moreover, it should be noted that because each firm is 
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we will have K k=  in equilibrium.  Let kτ  and PT  denote the capital tax rate 
and the pollution tax rate, and r  the capital rental rate.  The firm’s profit can then 
be expressed as follows: 
  (1 )k py rk T zpi τ= − + − .          (1) 
To prevent pollution from continuously growing, we must assume that pT  evolves 
with the aggregate capital stock, i.e., p pT Kτ=  where 0pτ >  is a policy 
parameter.7  It is quite easy to derive first-order conditions for k  and z : 
  rzk k )1(11 τα αα +=Λ −− ,          (2) 
  pTzk =Λ
−ααβ .           (3) 
 The use of the dirty input generates pollution emissions, which affect both the 
household’s felicity and time preference.  A representative household’s instantaneous 
felicity function is given by: 
  
σ
ση
−
=
−−
1
)( 1cz
u ,            (4) 
                                                                                                                                            
small relative to the aggregate level, it takes the aggregate stock K  as given when choosing k .  
That is, there are diminishing returns to capital at the microeconomic (firm) level, but the existence of 
externalities results in constant returns to capital at the macroeconomic level.  For a comprehensive 
rationale of the AK technology, see Turnovsky (2000) and Heijdra (2009). 
7
 If we assume a constant tax rate, the dirty inputs (pollution) will grow to infinity in the endless future.  
In this case, the economy will be forced to break down when the level of pollution exceeds the amount 
that human beings can bear.  Thus, in the environmental endogenous growth literature, it is common 
and necessary for the (private or public) price of pollution to evolve with another growing factor (see, 
e.g., Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995; Ono, 2007; Fullerton and Kim, 2008).  See also Smulders (1995) 
for a comprehensive discussion on this point. 
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where c  is the consumption and σ  the intertemporal substitution elasticity.  We 
follow Ayong Le Kama and Schubert (2007) to assume that 1>σ  to ensure that the 
felicity function is concave, i.e., 211 22 12( ) 0u u u− ≥  where 1 /u u c= ∂ ∂  and 
2 /u u z= ∂ ∂ .  The parameter 0>η  measures the negative impact of pollution on 
felicity. 
The representative household’s lifetime utility can be written as: 
  ,]exp[)(
0
dtuU Θ−⋅= ∫ ∞           (5) 
where 
  ∫≡Θ t st dsz0 )(θ , )(zθ=Θ , and 0)( <>′ zθ .       
Here Θ  is the endogenous discount factor determined by the past and current levels 
of the environmental quality.  It can also be referred to as an indicator of 
accumulated impatience (Obstfeld, 1990).  As revealed in (5), pollution not only has 
a negative impact on the level of utility, but also influences the household’s time 
preference, described by the term )(zθ .8  
The sign of )(zθ ′  is crucial throughout the analysis.  To reflect different 
specifications in the existing literature, we assume that the sign of )(zθ ′  can be 
greater than, less than, or equal to zero.  The specification 0)( <′ zθ  reflects the 
                                                 
8
 In our model, the dirty inputs z could specifically refer to petroleum, fuel oil or natural gas.  These 
inputs, when used in the production process, generate pollution that harms environmental quality.  For 
the sake of simplicity, we assume that the amount of dirty inputs directly represents the index of 
environmental quality and, accordingly, serves as a factor that affects the household’s utility and time 
preferences.  A similar setup may be found in, e.g., Chang et al. (2009) and Yanase (2011).  
Abandoning this assumption and using a more complicated environmental system will not affect our 
results as long as dirty inputs are monotonically related to environmental quality. 
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type of time preference in Ayong Le Kama and Schubert (2007); in this case a higher 
z  (i.e., a worse environment) causes patience.  By contrast, the specification 
0)( >′ zθ  reflects the type of time preference in Yanase (2011) and Vella et al. (2014); 
in this case a higher z  (i.e., a worse environment) induces impatience.  Finally, 
0)( =′ zθ  represents the traditional approach of an exogenous time preference.  
 Let ϕˆ  be the co-state variable associated with the capital stock.  The 
representative household maximizes the lifetime utility reported in equation (5), 
subject to the budget constraint k rk R c= + −  by choosing 0ˆ{ , , }tc k ϕ ∞=  where R  is 
the lump-sum transfer from the government.  We can then define the Hamiltonian for 
the household’s optimization as: 
  
1( )
ˆexp[ ] ( )
1
h czH rk R c
η σ
ϕ
σ
− −
= −Θ + + −
−
,      (6) 
The optimum conditions for the representative household with respect to the 
indicated variables are: 
  ϕσησ =−−− )1(: zcc ,          (7a) 
  ( ) ϕϕθϕ rzk −=: ,          (7b) 
cRrkk −+=:ˆφ ,           (7c) 
where ]exp[ˆ Θ= ϕϕ  and the transversality condition is 0ˆlim =
∞→
k
t
ϕ .  Equations (7a) 
and (7b) are the first-order conditions with respect to c  and k , respectively. 
Equation (7c) is the household budget constraint.  Of particular note, the household 
cannot affect the level of pollution so that it takes as given pollution z  and the rate 
of time preference Θ . 
The government rebates its tax revenues to the household in the form of a 
lump-sum transfer R .  As a result, the government’s flow budget constraint can be 
written as: 
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zkrkR pk ττ +=            (8) 
2.1. The decentralized equilibrium 
 The decentralized equilibrium is described by six equations, (2), (3), (7a), (7b), 
(7c), and the government budget constraint (8), in which the six unknowns, c , k , r , 
z , ϕ , and R , can be solved (see Appendix A for the full solution).  Moreover, by 
defining the transformed variable /x c k≡ , we can demonstrate that d / d 0x x > , 
which means that the steady state is unstable and the competitive equilibrium path has 
no transitional dynamics. 
Proposition 1. The macro equilibrium under the decentralized economy is unique and 
locally determinate. 
Proof: See Appendix A.  
 
3. The Growth Effect of an Environmental Tax 
We now deal with the growth effect of the environmental tax in the presence of 
an endogenous time preference.  Following the literature on the environment and 
endogenous growth, we assume that in the steady state of balanced growth the total 
pollution emissions are limited in a physical sense, and all other economic variables 
grow at a common constant endogenous growth rate g.  By letting a tilde denote the 
value along the balanced growth path (BGP), we introduce the following definition: 
Definition 1. The steady state of balanced growth is characterized by an equilibrium 
where 0z =  and gyycckk ~/// ===  .9 
                                                 
9
 From (3) and 
p pT kτ=  we can derive 
1/(1 ) / pz A
α
α τ = −  , which depends only on the exogenous 
parameters.  This means that the condition 0z =  is always met under the decentralized economy. 
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Based on Definition 1, we can obtain the balanced growth rate in the 
decentralized economy (see Appendix B), denoted by dg , as: 
 
11 1 ( )
1
d
k
g A z zαα θ
σ τ
−
 = − + 
   ,        (9) 
where 
1/(1 ) / pz A
α
α τ = −   denotes the (constant) value of the dirty input in the 
steady state of balanced growth. 
The relationship between the environmental tax and the long-term growth rate 
can be derived by differentiating dg  with respect to pτ , which yields: 
  

 ′++−
−= − )~(
1
~
)1(
d
~d 1
2 zz
Ag
k
p
pp
d
θ
τ
ατ
σατ
α
τ
α
.       (10) 
The result reported in (10) leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2. In the cases of time preferences featuring ( ) 0zθ ′ <  and ( ) 0zθ ′ = , 
raising the environmental tax reduces the growth rate.  However, in the cases of time 
preferences featuring ( ) 0zθ ′ > , the growth effect of the environmental tax is 
uncertain, implying that a rise in the environmental tax may boost economic growth. 
Proposition 2 indicates that if people become impatient due to their experience of 
a worse environmental quality, any policies that protect the environment can also 
positively contribute to economic growth.  A similar result (i.e., an environmental 
tax that induces a positive growth effect) is obtained in different setups considering, 
for example, the impact of a positive environmental externality on production 
(Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995; Fullerton and Kim, 2008), a positive externality in 
relation to abatement activities (Smulders and Gradus, 1996), an elastic labor supply 
(Hettich, 1998; Chen et al., 2003), the international accumulation of environmental 
assets (Ono, 2003a), and the existence of an indeterminate equilibrium path (Itaya, 
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2008).  Despite the fact that a growth-stimulating environmental tax is not novel in 
the literature, none of these previous contributions is related to endogenous time 
preferences.  Thus, the major contribution of this present paper is to highlight the 
role of environment-dependent time preferences in the context of the impact of 
environmental policies on economic growth.  In particular, Proposition 2 draws our 
attention to the point that different types of time preferences can generate diverse 
consequences of an environmental tax.  Overlooking this time preference effect may 
lead policy-makers to devise inadequate environmental policies. 
   
4. Social Planner and the Optimal Environmental Tax 
 Now we turn to study the optimal environmental tax.  In line with the 
Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) definition, the Pigouvian principle requires that the 
environmental tax be equal to the marginal environmental damage (MED) from 
pollution.  With this definition, in this section, we focus on whether the Pigouvian 
principle is optimal when time preferences can be influenced by environmental 
quality. 
 To derive the optimal tax policies, we first solve the social planner’s optimization 
problem.  The social planner maximizes (5) subject to the resource constraint, 
k y c= − , which can be derived by combining the household’s budget constraint, the 
government’s budget constraint, and the firm’s profit function.  The Hamiltonian for 
the social planner’s optimization spH  is given by: 
  
1( )
ˆ
ˆexp[ ] ( ) ( )
1
sp czH y c z
η σ
λ µθσ
− −
= −Θ + − −
−
,      (11) 
where λˆ  and µˆ  are the co-state variables associated with, respectively, the capital 
stock and the “stock of accumulated impatience” (Obstfeld, 1990).  The first-order 
conditions for this problem are: 
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  λσησ =−−− )1(zc ,           (12) 
  
λθλλα )(1 zAz +−=−  ,          (13) 
  
0)()1(1)1(1 =′−−+− −−−−− zAkzzc θµαλη ασησ ,     (14) 
  )(
1
)( 1
z
cz µθµσ
ση
−=
−
−
−−
 ,         (15) 
where ]exp[ˆ Θ= λλ , ]exp[ˆ Θ= µµ , and we need to impose the transversality 
condition 0lim =
→∞
sp
t
H
 to ensure utility maximization.   
 Some comments with regard to the optimal conditions of the social planner are 
worth mentioning here.  First, in contrast to the representative household, the social 
planner takes into account the capital externality and social marginal cost of pollution 
when choosing k  and z .  Second, in contrast to the representative household, the 
social planner reckons in the effect of pollution on time preferences when selecting 
z .  Third, let us first consider the case of exogenous time preferences ( ) 0zθ ′ = .  It 
can be seen from (14) that increasing one unit of z  is accompanied by two 
consequences: a decrease in the household’s felicity (captured by the first term), and a 
higher output (captured by the second term).  To put it more plainly, the social 
planner faces a trade-off between the environmental concerns and economic 
development.  However, when the time preference depending on environmental 
quality is present, the social planner must additionally consider the effect of pollution 
on time preferences.  This obviously complicates the decision-making process 
regarding pollution.  Moreover, we will show in the following that this linkage may 
have important implications for the optimal environmental tax. 
4.1. Stability of the socially optimal BGP 
 In this subsection, we discuss the stability property of the socially balanced 
growth path.  First, we define )(/)()( zzzz θθε ′≡  as the elasticity of the utility 
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discount rate )(zθ .  Accordingly, the dynamic system of the centralized economy in 
z  can be described by (see Appendix C) 
  


 −+−−


−+∆=
−ασηασθεσ
ση 1)]1()1([)()(
1
Azzzx
z
z
,   (16) 
where 
  )1/()(
)](1[ 1
σσεη
εα α
−+
−−
=
−
z
Azz
x ,          (16a) 
  
αα σηασαεηασ
ε
ε
−− −+−+−+−−′≡∆ 11 )]1()1(][1)([])1[()(
)( AzzxAzz
z
z
. 
                (16b) 
 We assume that the condition ( ) min[ ( 1) / ,1 ]zε η σ σ α< − −  is met throughout, 
which is sufficient to ensure that x  is strictly positive.  Finally, by linearizing (16) 
around the steady-state equilibrium and performing a few steps of mathematical 
manipulation, we obtain 
  )~(~ zzxz −⋅= ,            (17) 
where )~(~ zxx =  can be derived from (16a).  Let ξ  be the characteristic root of the 
dynamic system. Then, from (17) we have 0~ >= xξ .  Given that ξ  is an unstable 
characteristic root and z  is a control variable, we can thus conclude that the socially 
balanced growth equilibrium is locally determinate.  In other words, the social 
planner’s economy jumps to a unique balanced growth path. 
Proposition 3. The socially optimal BGP is unique and locally determinate. 
4.2. Optimal environmental tax 
 Now we deal with the optimal environmental tax policy.  Of particular note, we 
focus on the optimal tax rule in the sense that it achieves the socially optimal steady 
state of balanced growth.  By comparing (12) with the household’s first-order 
conditions, we can derive the necessary condition ϕλ =  to reach the optimal 
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outcome.  In Appendix D we derive the optimal tax rates on capital and the pollution 
input, which are: 
  1−=∗ ατ k ,            (18) 
  
( )
1p
x z
z
θτ η σ
∗ ′= +
−
 

.           (19) 
 To examine the efficiency of the Pigouvian principle, we follow Bovenberg and 
Goulder (1996) to define the MED of pollution (in terms of the marginal utility of 
capital), denoted by D , as 
  
/u zD
λ
∂ ∂≡ − .            (20) 
We define kDD /~ ≡  to evaluate the MED in the steady state, and by using (12) and 
(20) we can obtain   
  
xD
z
η= 

.            (21) 
By inserting (21) into (19) and given 1σ > , we can see that pτ ∗  is higher than, 
lower than, or equal to MED if ( )zθ ′  is lower than, higher than, or equal to zero.  
Thus we have the following proposition: 
Proposition 4. In the case of an exogenous time preference, the Pigouvian principle is 
optimal.  In the case of an endogenous time preference, by contrast, the optimal 
environmental tax rate should be higher (lower) than MED if ( ) 0zθ ′ <  ( ( ) 0zθ ′ > ). 
In the decentralized economy, there exist three kinds of externalities (distortions): 
(i) the capital externality, (ii) the pollution externality in terms of felicity, and (iii) the 
pollution externality in terms of time preferences.  In view of (16), it should be noted 
that the optimal capital tax rate * 1kτ α= −  is strictly negative, which indicates that 
the government should subsidize the use of capital to remove distortion (i).  This is 
because the atomistic firms do not recognize the positive externality of capital, so that 
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the level of aggregate capital in the decentralized equilibrium will be inefficiently low.  
Therefore, to achieve the social optimum, it is necessary to motivate the firm to 
employ more capital by subsidizing it (see, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1992).  
More importantly, in (19) we see that the optimal environmental tax should be 
utilized to correct distortions (ii) and (iii).  Nevertheless, the well-known Pigouvian 
principle suggests that a tax rate on the pollution emissions is equal to MED.  As a 
consequence, it can remedy distortion (ii) but fails to correct distortion (iii).  This 
means that the Pigouvian principle is efficient only when distortion (iii) is absent, that 
is, only when the time preferences do not depend on the environmental quality 
( ( ) 0zθ ′ = ).  In the presence of distortion (iii) ( ( ) 0zθ ′ ≠ ), however, the Pigouvian 
principle cannot remedy such an inefficiency arising from the environment-dependent 
time preferences.10   
Proposition 4 shows us that whether the optimal environmental tax rate should be 
higher or lower than MED depends crucially on the types of time preferences.  The 
intuition can be explained by inspecting equation (14), which is the social planner’s 
optimal choice of z .  We first consider the case of ( ) 0zθ ′ > .  In this case, the 
third term on the left-hand-side of (14) is positive (note that 0µ < ; see Appendix D).  
This represents a beneficial effect of raising z , and thus implies that the social 
                                                 
10
 A considerable number of studies (e.g., Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994; Bovenberg and Goulder, 
1996; Williams, 2002, 2003; Bento and Jacobsen, 2007; Liu, 2013) have examined whether the 
Pigouvian principle is efficient and many of them have reached the conclusion that the answer is no.  
A main reason for the inefficiency of a Pigouvian tax in previous studies is the preexistence of other 
distortionary taxes.  In departing from these studies, our paper instead stresses that the inefficiency of 
a Pigouvian tax comes from the existence of the environment-dependent time preferences. 
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planner tends to choose a higher level of z .  To interpret this result, we must notice 
that by implementing the optimal capital tax rate * 1kτ α= − , the social planner can 
reconcile the decentralized growth rate with the socially optimal growth rate.  With 
the consumption path being the same, a higher time preference implies that the 
households can enjoy a higher level of welfare.  By taking this effect into account, 
the social planner will tend to choose a higher z  (i.e., a higher ( )zθ ).  As a 
consequence, the optimal environmental tax should be lower than that in the case of 
an exogenous time preference (i.e., in the case where the optimal environmental tax is 
equal to MED).  Following a similar inference, we can conclude that under the case 
where ( ) 0zθ ′ < , the optimal environmental tax rate should be higher than MED. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper sets up a simple endogenous growth model in which time preferences 
are endogenously determined by the environmental quality.  Our model 
comprehends different types of time preferences in the previous literature.  We show 
within this framework that both the growth effect of environmental taxes and the 
efficiency of the Pigouvian tax rate are crucially related to the distinctive feature of 
the time preferences.  In particular, we demonstrate that a Pigouvian tax may be 
inefficient in the presence of an endogenous time preference.  
Regarding future research, it would be relevant to investigate empirically what 
types of time preferences the public owns.  Another interesting line would be to 
examine whether countries differ in the types of time preferences and, if they do, what 
factors cause the differences.  Based on our theoretical analysis, we believe that 
these empirical studies would be valuable in designing environmental policies. 
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Appendix A: The Decentralized Equilibrium  
In this Appendix, we first derive the full solution in the decentralized economy, and 
then examine the stability property of the dynamic system.  The decentralized 
equilibrium is described by six equations: (2), (3), (7a), (7b), (7c), and the government 
budget constraint (8) together with α−=Λ 1AK  and K k= , which are restated as 
follows: 
αατ −=+ 1)1( Azrk ,           (A1) 
  kAkz pτα
α
=−
−)1( ,          (A2) 
ϕσησ =−−− )1(zc ,           (A3) 
  ϕϕθϕ rz −= )( ,           (A4) 
cRrkk −+= ,            (A5) 
  zkrkR pk ττ += .           (A6) 
The above six equations determine six unknowns: r , z , c , k , ϕ , and R .   
 To derive the optimal choice of the firms, we first make use of (A2) to obtain the 
steady-state dirty input ( )[ ] ατα /1/1~ pAz −= .  By substituting z~  into (A1), the 
steady state capital rental rate is ( )[ ] ( )[ ] αατατα /)1(/11/~ −−+= pk AAr .  
Given that other endogenous variables { c , k , ϕ , R } evolve continuously, we 
then need to define the transformed variables kcx /≡ , σϕkf ≡ , and kRq /≡  to 
obtain the stationary values of these transformed variables.  Differentiating (A3) 
with respect time and using the household’s budget constraint (A5), we can derive 
[ ] σθα /)~(~~~ 1 zrzAx −−= −  in which we have used the steady state condition 0== zx   
(recall that in footnote 9 we have shown that 0z =  is always met).  Based on (A3), 
we obtain )1(~~~ σησ −−−= zxf .  Finally, from (A6) we can derive zrq pk ~~~ ττ += .   
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We now turn to examine the stability property of the dynamic system.  From 
(7a), (7b), and (7c) we can derive  
  k p
k
r r z x
k
τ τ= + + −

,          (A7) 
  
[ ( )]c r z
c
θ
σ
−
=

.           (A8) 
Thus, the dynamics of the consumption-capital ratio can be derived as  
  
(1 ) ( )
k p
x c k r z
r z x
x c k
σ θ τ τ
σ
− −
= − = − − +
 
,      (A9) 
It is clear from equations (A1) and (A2) that r  and z  are solely determined by the 
exogenous parameters.  As a result, the right-hand side of (A9) is increasing in x , 
implying that the decentralized equilibrium is characterized by local instability and 
determinacy. 
 
Appendix B: Derivation of the Balanced Growth Rate 
First, by utilizing the conditions of the BGP, / 0z z = , and (7a) and (7b) it is easy to 
obtain that 
  
[ ])~(~1~ zr
c
cg d θ
σ
−==

.          (A10) 
Then, by substituting 1AK α−Λ =  into (2) and (3) as well as using the equilibrium 
condition K k= , we can obtain rzA k ~)1(~1 τα α +=−  and pp kTzA τα α ==− − /~)1( .  
Lastly, inserting these two conditions into (A10) gives the balanced growth rate (9) in 
the main text. 
 
Appendix C: Derivation of Equation (16)  
First, we define )(/)()( zzzz θθε ′≡  as the elasticity of the utility discount rate )(zθ  
and make use of the transversality condition ttH sp ∀= 0)(  to derive 
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 

 +−=+−
−− αα
σ
σεβη 11
1
)( AzxzAzx .        (A11) 
Differentiating (A11) with respect to time t , we obtain 
 
x
x
z
xAz
x
z
z
xAz
Azz
z
z
z  


−+−−−=


−−
−+−+′
−−
−
)(
1)1()1(
)1)(1)((
)(
)(
11
1
ε
σ
ση
ηαηα
ααε
ε
ε
αα
α
.
                (A12) 
Moreover, equation (12) can be rearranged as σσησ λkzx =−−− )1( .  
Differentiating this equation with respect to time t  yields 
 

 −+−−−−= −
z
z
xAzz
x
x  )1()1()(1 1 σησσθσ
α
,      (A13) 
where we have used (13) and the resource constraint cAzk −= −α1 .  Combining 
(A12) and (A13) and using (A11), we can derive equation (16) in the main text.  
 
Appendix D: Derivation of Equations (18) and (19) 
In line with the proof in Palivos et al. (1997) and Ayong Le Kama and Schubert 
(2007), by the transversality condition ttH sp ∀= 0)(  we have 
  

 −+−=
−
−−
)(
1
)(
)(
1 11 cAkzcz
z
α
ση
λσθµ .       (A14) 
In line with Ayong Le Kama and Schubert (2007), we can demonstrate that 0µ <  
given that 1σ > .  By inserting (12) and (A14) into (14) we can obtain 
  

 +−
′=−+− −− αα σ
σ
θ
θαη 1
1)(
)()1( Akzc
z
zAkz
z
c
,     (A15) 
and by evaluating the steady state, we have 
  

 +−
′=−+− −− αα σ
σ
θ
θαη 1~~
1)~(
)~(
~)1(
~
~
zAx
z
z
zA
z
x
.     (A16) 
Then, utilizing (12) and (13) yields 
  ( ))~(~1~ 1 zzAg sp θ
σ
α
−=
−
.          (A17) 
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The first-best tax rates are derived by comparing (A16) and (A17) with the 
decentralized decisions (3) and (9).  
 Lastly, from (A8) and the resource constraint k y c= −  we can derive  
  xAzzr
k
k
c
c
x
x
+−
−
=−= −α
σ
θ 1)(
,        (A18) 
At the steady state, 0x =  such that ασθ −+−−= 1/))((~ Azzrx .  Next, by inserting 
x  into (A16) as well as by utilizing 1kτ α= −  and rzA k ~)1(~1 τα α +=− , we can 
obtain (19) in the main text.  
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